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The Canadian Role in Operation
''Charnwood, '' 8 July 1944
A Case Study in Tank/Infantry
Doctrine and Practice
David A. Wilson
n the morning of 8 July 1944, soldiers of
the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (9 CIB)
left their startlines near the Norman village of
Vieux Cairon heading for Buron and Gruchy; two
villages nearly 2,000 yards across open ground
to the south. Their advance was part of Operation
"Charnwood," British I Corps' final assault on
Caen. By the end of the day most objectives were
secured, and on 9 July Caen north of the Orne
River and Canal was captured. General Dempsey,
General Officer Commanding (GOC) British 2nd
Army expressed his satisfaction, saying that the
operations of 8 and 9 July were "well and cleanly
carried out."' Troops of the 3rd Canadian
Infantry Division (3 CID) and the 2nd Canadian
Armoured Brigade (2 CAB) shared in the victory
no less than the British divisions that took part.

O

"Charnwood" stands apart from other
Canadian operations in Normandy because it was
the only operation of its type undertaken by 3
CID and 2 CAB as complete formations. After
"Charnwood" II Canadian Corps became
operational, and the scale, tempo and
expectations of operations altered considerably.
The capture of Caen, therefore, affords insights
into tactical doctrine that are obscured by later
large-scale operations with more ambitious
objectives. In particular, in this operation the
Canadian armour and infantry defeated the
Germans by employing tanks as direct-fire closesupport weapons. In fact, such intimate support
had not been a part of Canadian tank/ infantry
doctrine since the introduction of the Sherman
tank in 1943. Instead, since the fall of 1943
armoured units were told specifically to work to
the enemy's flanks and support by fire, not by

participating in the close infantry battle. The
fighting on 8 July indicates that in this instance
at least, Canadian troops won in spite of the
prevailing doctrine and not because of it.
Doctrine figures prominently in the
continuing debate over the Canadian Army's
battlefield performance in Normandy. In his
concluding remarks on the Normandy campaign,
C.P. Stacey clearly stated that the Germans
achieved tactical superiority over the Allies. 2
Stacey's conclusions have been echoed and
amplified in more recent works. Writing in 1991,
John A. English offered a more detailed
explanation for the Canadians' lacklustre
performance, listing doctrine as a partial
explanation along with inadequate commanders,
inferior weaponry and lack of fighting skills. 3
David Bercusson added superb German NCOs,
junior officers, small-unit tactics, and training
as reasons why the fighting went on so long. 4 Jack
Granatstein, although writing specifically of
Canadian generalship, also noted the flaws in the
British doctrine followed by Canada. 5
Interest in the Normandy campaign and the
nature of the fighting there has not abated over
time. In recent articles, not all have been willing
to grant the Germans total superiority on the
battlefield. Oliver Haller clearly demonstrated
that the 12th SS could be outfought, most notably
in their counterattacks from 7-10 July 1944. 6
His account of the fighting carries an implicit
message: the Canadians won because their smallunit tactics were superior to those of the Germans
in this particular battle. Marc Milner has recently
added to this argument the observation that the
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open ground the Canadians were constantly
attacking was ideally suited to the German
penchant for defending with fire. Milner also
factored in the inadequate tanks, and concluded
by reminding readers that it was the Germans
who were ground down in Normandy. 7 Set against
Milner's analysis must be Roman Jarymowycz's
argument that the source of tactical frustration
was primarily doctrinal, a point of view he
reinforced in a response to Milner. 8
The literature to date, however, has not
directly addressed the central core of the issue:
the failure of Canadian tanks and infantry to
coordinate their actions effectively on the
battlefield. That failure may legitimately be
attributed to the inadequate tank/infantry
cooperation doctrine adopted from the British
despite considerable evidence that it did not
work. 9 This returns us to the question, just what
was this tank/infantry doctrine, how did it
develop, and how was it applied at the divisional
level in Operation "Charnwood"?

The Doctrine

1\ ny discussion of tank/infantry doctrine must
.rlbegin with the disclaimer that it is not the
doctrine developed for armoured formations.
Tanks and infantry in armoured divisions studied
an entirely separate set of manuals with its own
lineage. Intended for the breakout and pursuit
phase of operations, armoured forces in
armoured divisions focussed on coordination
with infantry formations rather than cooperation
with infantry units. As a rule, either "other
formations" or the armoured division's infantry
brigade created the breach in the enemy line
through which the tanks were launched. 10 In
contrast, brigades of "army tanks" - e.g., the
Royal Tank Regiments - were specifically
developed to support infantry divisions on the
battlefield, primarily in the direct-fire role.
The tank/infantry doctrine that guided
Canadian troops in Operation "Charnwood"
belonged - in theory - to the army tank brigade
tradition and did not, of course, spring up
overnight. A body of doctrinal literature existed
that extended back as far as the First World War,
although recent manuals reflecting wartime
experience were of more obvious tactical value.
These Second World War training pamphlets were

the blueprint for future battles, outlining in
particular frontage, density, pace of advance and
the ratio of tanks to infantry.
In 1939 when Canadian troops began to
study how tanks and infantry divisions worked
together they received their information from
British manuals. Basic to British thinking was
the primacy of infantry who were considered the
backbone of the attack. However, the manuals
informed the infantry that any success depended,
among other things, on the "aid of tanks" to break
into a position. 11 Royal Tank Regiments
conformed to this view of their role, holding that
they were a "supporting weapon" whose principle
task was "to assist the infantry to gain and hold
the objective." 12 In contrast to armoured brigades,
the manuals specifically noted that army tanks
were "not designed to act independently," and to
that end they were organized in battalions
intended for close cooperation with the infantry
in the attack. 13
According to doctrine in 1939, attacks
arrived on the objective in echelons, with tanks
moving at tank speed forming the Assault
Echelon. More tanks, accompanied by infantry
and moving at infantry speed followed in the
Support Echelon. 14 Recognition of the power of
the "modern establishment of anti-tank weapons"
led to the principle of concentrating even army
tanks in time and space. Thus, the 1939
pamphlet warned against using less than one
army tank battalion in an attack, and elsewhere
it noted that in open country and reasonable
visibility one such unit was able to neutralize the
frontage which could be attacked by one infantry
battalion. 15 Foreshadowing later actions in
"Charnwood," the tanks were specifically warned
against bypassing villages as long as fire from
them was holding up the infantry. 16 For army
tanks, close support meant close support.
Employing tactics in these training pamphlets
the British enjoyed initial success on the
battlefields ofNorthAfrica. Indeed, the attacks
on the Italian fortified camps by 7th Royal Tank
Regiment (7 RTR) have been characterised as
representing the tank/infantry attack in its classic
form. 17 Actions in North Africa seemed to indicate
that the doctrine worked and the was reflected
in subsequent manuals. When the War Office
issued The Employment of Army Tanks in Cooperation with Irifantry in March 1941 much of
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A Sherman tank of the 1st Hussars moving up in support of the irifantry, Normandy, France, 28 June 1944.

the doctrine remained the same. Both infantry
and army tank manuals continued to stress the
need for a common doctrine without falling into
routine methods. 18 The closest cooperation was
demanded of both arms, the infantry being
informed that an attack against organised
resistence must be supported by army tanks, and
that the tanks needed engineers and infantry to
cross tank obstacles. 19 Also continued was the
system of attacking in echelons, the tanks in the
Assault Echelon moving at tank speed and the
tanks in the Support Echelon moving at infantry
speed. Unchanged was the ratio of tanks to
infantry against organized resistance one
battalion of tanks was to work with one battalion
of infantry. Within that allotment, the distribution
might be one leading squadron with each leading
company of infantry, followed in the next echelon
by troops working with individual platoons. 20
Two years later in 1943, with rather limited
battle experience, Canadian troops continued to
follow British doctrine. By this time though the
Canadian Army was producing manuals written
in Canada. One such manual, from the Canadian
Battle Drill Training Centre in Vernon, BC,
displayed only minor differences from those of
1941. It impressed upon infantry that army tanks

were a necessary adjunct to success and that a
favourable outcome depended upon the close
cooperation between troops of tanks and
platoons ofinfantry. 21 Battalion attacks were to
be on a narrow two-company frontage of possibly
600 yards. There would still be three echelons,
with the tanks of the first echelon moving at top
speed crushing initial resistance by velocity and
weight of numbers. Unusually, this Canadian
training pamphlet called for the second echelon
tanks to also move at tank speed although the
echelon as a whole moved at infantry speed. 22
That this approach might present problems
appears to have been neglected or dismissed.
Meanwhile back in Britain, the War Office
issued The Co-operation qf Infantry and Tanks,
proclaiming that it superseded The Employment
of Army Tanks in Co-operation with lf!:fantry of
1941, and that "the doctrine here stated will be
accepted as the basic teaching governing the
employment of tanks and infantry in
co-operation. "23 In this manual, for the first time
anti-tank mines were given serious consideration.
It was now accepted that they restricted the
freedom of manoeuvre of tanks, a freedom which
could only be restored by the infantry first
clearing paths through the minefields or by the
9
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use of specialized devices such as flails. 24 Attacks
were still mounted in echelons, with no less than
one squadron per echelon. Maintained also was
the employment of complete army tank battalions
for specific operations. 25 As for frontages of
attack, the pamphlet suggested that 300 yards
should seldom be exceeded by a tank squadron.
From that figure, it deduced that an infantry
division attacking with two battalions and two
tank battalions would normally operate on a
1,200 yard frontage. Although it cautioned that
these figures were "purely for training purposes,"
what is important. here is the implied one-to-one
ratio of infantry to tank units in the deliberate
attack. 26 Taken as a whole, there was still not
much new in this document, the primary
exception was the increasing recognition of the
serious problem anti-tank mines presented.
Sooner than expected, this equation was to
change.
Canadian troops barely digested even these
minor alterations to tactical doctrine when the
Headquarters of 21 Army Group intervened. In
July 1943, their monthly Training Letter stressed
the limitations of tanks in the face of minefields
and anti-tank guns. Overturning the doctrinal
beliefs of 20 years, they now claimed that infantry
attacks could succeed without tanks.
Consequently, the infantry would now lead the
attack with the tanks supporting from hull-down
positions, where their fire was "more effective
than close contact. "27 Advice such as this is
reminiscent of the doctrine followed by armoured
formations on those rare occasions when the
tanks of the armoured brigade moved to the flank
to support the motor battalion by fire. 28 More
detailed instructions soon followed.
The Co-operation of Tanks with Infantry
Divisions in Offensive Operations, issued by 21
Army Group in November 1943, effectively drove
a wedge between the infantry and their supporting
tanks. Documents such as this provide a written
basis for English's comments on the doctrinal
tendency of armour to hang too far back in the
Normandy campaign. 29 Although the manual
claimed that it was based on The Co-operation
of Irifantry and Tanks of May 1943, that was
t.rue only in the most limited sense. 30 While Parts
I and II were about the employment and tactical
formations of infantry tanks cooperating with
infantry, Part III dealt with the implications of
using the Sherman in the army tank role. What

Part III had to say about the Sherman effectively
negated all that had been said in the first 25 pages
ofthe 33-page document.
In Part I ratios and frontages were unchanged
from previous manuals. The best results were
obtained by concentration, with one armoured
regiment to one battalion of infantry still in favour.
Further, the tanks were warned against splitting
squadrons between echelons, now renamed
Assault, Support and Reserve. That ratio would
be maintained even when the allotment of tanks
to an infantry brigade might consist of only one
regiment. In such a case it explicitly stated that
the one regiment would be employed on the
frontage of one infantry battalion. The only cloud
on the horizon was a caveat against the infantry
expecting the immediate physical presence of the
tanks. They were informed that being in
communication with tanks was a more vital
factor. 31
In Part III the cloud on the horizon became a
downpour. There, the implications of the
changeover to Sherman tanks were clearly
spelled out. Thinner armour on the Sherman
(compared to the Churchill tank usually found
in army tank brigades) meant it was more easily
penetrated by lieavy anti-tank guns and could not
carry out the infantry tank role in the deliberate
attack. Thus, the infantry were informed that
tanks were no longer partners in the assault, but
rather (in an unhappy phrase) the "backers up"
to the assaulting infantry. 32 Driving home the
message carried in Part II, it admitted that
occasions would arise when tank squadrons
would be allotted one to a battalion. In those
cases, the infantry were expected to lead as one
tank squadron was not strong enough to support
a two-company frontage. 33 Effectively, Canadian
infantry had not only lost their intimate tank
support but might have to attack with fewer than
expected tanks in support. Thus, the advent of
minefields and the increased number and
lethality of anti-tank weapons had separated the
infantry from the intimate support of the tanks.
Some infantry formations were not long in
asking pressing questions about what "backers
up" meant exactly. The British 49th Division
worried that it might result in the tanks being
too far back. 34 Twenty-First Army Group soon
responded with another apparent shift of
emphasis. Within two weeks of assuming
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Privates Harry Parker (top) and Gus McKinnon of
the Highland Light Infantry following the battle for
Buron, 9 July 1944.

command of 21 Army Group, General
Montgomery advised the War Office that he could
not accept the doctrine from the previous
November. Moreover, he promised that it would
be replaced or modified to a large extent,
presumably before the anticipated invasion of
France. 35
While 21 Army Group was re-writing their
doctrine, the War Office released a new Infantry
Training manual that addressed some of the
battlefield problems associated with tank/
infantry cooperation. Issued in January 1944,
this pamphlet contained information that
contradicted itself. There were references to the
importance of The Co-operation of Infantry and
Tanks while acknowledging that cruiser tanks
(the British term for the tanks contained in an
armoured brigade) would be confined to
supporting with fire in the deliberate attack. 36
Further, tank support was effectively halved; a
tank squadron now expected to cover 600 rather
than 300 yards. Moreover, that squadron would
be "handled" by its commander according to the
ground and not invariably beside the infantry. 37
The separation of tanks and infantry appears
complete and the shape of future operations in
Normandy more explicable.
Before Canadian units were committed to
battle, 21 Army Group finally weighed in with
their last advice on the problem of tank/infantry
cooperation. Two aspects of Notes on the
Employment of Tanks in Support of Irifantry in
Battle are worthy of mention. First was the return
of tanks as the sole element of the Assault
Echelon immediately following the engineers of
the Gapping Force. 38 Second was the inclusion
of other arms of service further forward in the
attacking force. 39 This short and idealized booklet
gave a precise view of the defences likely to be
found, mentioning minefields, wire, anti-tank
ditches, section posts, crawl trenches, antipersonnel mines and booby traps. 40 Despite its
attention to detail it contributed little to providing
instruction in tank/ infantry cooperation, and by
differing from concurrent doctrine may have
added to the doctrinal confusion.
Having mentioned above the types of defences
to be encountered it may be helpful to add more

detail, for the attacks in Operation "Charnwood"
faced almost the classic form of German
defences. The War Office pamphlet on that topic
informed that the German intention was to
"destroy the enemy by fire." 41 Ground was chosen
according to its suitability for such purposes, and
the fortified ring of villages north of Caen fit that
description well. Mines and wire certainly existed
but they took second place to what the pamphlet
called the "co-ordination of fire of high- and low11
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Canadian irifantry advancing near Gruchy, France, 9 July 1944.

trajectory weapons," that is mortars and machine
guns. 42 The theoretical employment of German
armoured troops in defence also corresponded
to the situation north of Caen. Their defences
were usually built around anti-tank guns acting
as a cover for the divisional artillery, with the
tanks kept as mobile reserve. 43 This arrangement
looks very much like the tactical situation of 8
July 1944. It was also noted that given several
weeks the Germans would systematically
construct continuous trenches and permanent
dugouts, and they had certainly been allowed that
time in Normandy. 44
A summing up of tank/infantry doctrine to
this point in the war reveals elements of both
continuity and change. Frontage of attack and
pace of advance had remained constant
throughout as they were keyed to infantry tactics.
The ideal ratio of combat arms was maintained
at one tank regiment to one infantry battalion
despite circumstances when this rule could be
broken. In 1944, defensive elements such as antitank mines and anti-tank guns brought more
integration of other supporting arms and the
relegation of tanks to further back in the attack.
From leading the assault they were now found
supporting with fire from the flank or rear. It
remained to be seen whether this arrangement
was workable under battle conditions.

The Operation
A!Jeration "Charnwood" began on 8 July 1944,
V~hen the British I Corps, strongly reinforced
to a strength of 115,000 personnel, opened its
drive to clear Caen as far as the Orne River. 45
Three infantry divisions were to attack on an
eight-mile front, the 3rd Canadian on the right,
the 59th British in the centre and the 3rd British
on the left. 46 The infantry were supported by the
fire of656 guns ofvarious calibres, 350 tanks in
two armoured brigades plus specialized armour
such as flails, flame-throwers and AVREsY Some
of the artillery had begun firing a series of
concentrations at 2300 hours the night before,
targeting some 15 German-held villages around
Caen. 48
As an operation, "Charnwood" was cast in
the mould of the British way of warfare in the
mid-twentieth century. Limited in its aims, this
was a "set-piece" battle, the kind the British had
been fighting for two years. Thus, its ultimate
objectives were in the range of 4,000 yards; to
be accomplished in four phases each with their
own objectives. In Phase I the two British
divisions would capture Galmanche, la Bijude
and Lebisey Wood. Once these objectives were
achieved, all three divisions would continue the
advance in Phase II. This would see the
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Canadians capture Buron, Gruchy, the Chateau
St. Louet and Authie while the 59th Division
pushed south on their left flank, moving through
St. Contest and Epron. Phase III called for the
Canadians to capture Cussy and the Abbey
d'Ardenne, pushing the Germans back to the line
Franqueville-Ardenne. In Phase IV, all formations
would exploit to the final objectives. 49
The villages attacked by I Corps were on the
last high ground before Caen, including some of
the highest ground between that town and the
coast. Once the Germans gave them up they
would have to move back to the high ground to
the south of Caen. That alone might have dictated
defending the ground they presently held, but in
any case, Hitler had forbidden withdrawal. To
defend this critical ground the Germans could
spare but two divisions in the front line, 16th
Luftwaffe Field Division on the right and the 12th
SS Panzer Division on the left. The former, with
aid of a tank battalion from 21st Panzer Division,
held the line from the Canal de Caen west to the
railway near Cambes. From that point, the 12th
SS continued the line through Galmanche,
Buron, Gruchy and then south to Carpiquet
airfield and finally crossing the Odon near
Verson. 50 According to Kurt Meyer, commanding
the 12th SS, there were "eleven dazed battalions"
defending this ground the Allies wanted so much,
a serious imbalance of forces by any measure.s'
To lessen the odds. the Germans had made their
usual clever use of ground, creating in the words
of the British Official History, "mutually
supporting positions based on what were by now
virtually tank-proof villages." Ellis listed the
villages of Lebisey, Galmanche, Gruchy,
Franqueville, Cussy and Couvre-Chef as
belonging in this category; four of these six were
to be taken by the Canadians. 52

The Canadian Attacks
anadian troops began to move at 0730 hours
on 8 July, an hour after General Crocker,
GOC of I Corps, ordered Phase II to commence.
Objectives for 3 CID in this phase included the
villages of Gruchy and Buran, while on their left
the 59th Division attacked St. Contest, Malon and
Epron. 53 On their assigned four-mile frontage
Canadian planners made their dispositions as
best as its convex shape allowed. That shape
seemed to preclude attacking with two brigades

C

in line. A second complication was the interdivisional boundary with 59th Division that
narrowed around Cussy before widening again
closer to Caen.
Operating under these constraints, 3 CID
decided on a plan that entailed 9th Canadian
Infantry Brigade (9 CIB) capturing Buran, Gruchy
and Authie, with later exploitation to Chateau St.
Louet and Franqueville. Once 9 CIB had secured
Authie, Major-General Keller would swing his axis
of advance 90 degrees, 7th Canadian Infantry
Brigade (7 CIB) attacking southwest toward
Cussy and Ardenne. Only in the exploitation of
Phase IV would 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
(8 CIB) join in the advance.
To support the infantry, 3 CID assigned the
three armoured regiments of 2 CAB to the three
infantry brigades: the Sherbrooke Fusiliers
Regiment (SFR) to 9 CIB, the 1st Hussars to 7
CIB and the Fort Garry Horse (FGH) to 8 CIB. At
brigade level this process continued, with
individual squadrons placed in support of
infantry battalions. Even 8 CIB, though not
participating in the initial phases, followed this
form, allocating its armour to individual
battalions. 54 This arrangement, while providing
good direct support, was too weak and too
dispersed according to earlier doctrine.
On the frontage that 3 CID would be attacking
Kurt Meyer had placed his 25th SS Panzer
Grenadier Regiment, reinforced by elements of
the divisional tanks and artillery. Although Meyer
had referred above to 11 defending battalions.
that figure reflected the total of combat units
within the division as a whole. Hubert Meyer,
principal staff officer of the 12th SS, spoke more
realistically of"four punch-drunk battalions" as
holding the line. 55 He was obviously referring to
the three infantry battalions of the 25th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment and the single battalion from
the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Rifle
companies of the regiments (supported by the
mortars and machine guns of the machine gun
companies) were deployed along the front,
occupying some villages and in front of others.
Meyer had 60 tanks operational, most held in
reserve or in ambush positions. Despite being a
naturally strong position to defend by fire it
lacked depth. As Michael Reynolds has noted, it
was certainly not the "classic" defensive position
of the manuals with Battle Outposts, Advance
13
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Operation "Charnwood"
8 July 1944
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Carpiquet
and Main Positions. 56 In the sector attacked by
the Canadians it was no secret where the
Germans were. Defence overlays prepared for
"Charnwood" more or less accurately plotted the
location of troops, trenches, suspected minefields
and support weapons. 57 The weight of the initial
attack by 9 CIB would fall primarily upon the
3rd Battalion of the 25th with its three rifle
companies, mortars and machine guns.

Once assigned his brigade objectives,
Brigadier Cunningham of 9 CIB decided on a plan
that involved attacking two battalions up. On the
left, the Highland Light Infantry (HLI) supported
by "A" Squadron of the Sherbrookes would
assault Buran, while on the right the Stormont,
Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (SDG),
backed by "B" Squadron of the Sherbrookes,
would capture Gruchy. Once Buran was secured,
the North Nova Scotia Highlanders (NNS) would
mount their attack on Authie and the SDGs move

14
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on to capture Chateau St. Louet. Failure to
capture Buron quickly would impose subsequent
delays on both brigade and divisional plans.
When the HLI moved from their startline
around Vieux Cairon they attacked with two
companies up, "D" on the right and "B" on the
left. Supporting them, the tanks of "A" Squadron
moved tactically with two troops up and two
back: No.1 Troop supporting "D" Company, No.2
Troop with "B" Company, and No.4 and HQ
Troop following in the rear. 58 As the Canadian
infantry and armour approached Buran they
came under machine gun and mortar fire just
before 0800 hours. On the right, No.1 Troop
quickly lost three of its four tanks to mines and
88 mm anti-tank guns firing from the southwest
and had to be replaced by No.4 Troop. On the
left the situation was initially more favourable,
but there too Panzerfausts and 88s soon
accounted for all of No.2 Troop. These casualties
occurred while the tanks were supporting from
the flank, according to current doctrine.
Squadron Headquarters then moved up to
support "B" Company of the HLI, but fear of yet
more minefields kept them from supporting the
infantry closely enough to clear the enemy from
their trenches. It took considerable time for the
HLI to contact the tanks. The first message was
passed at 0801 hours but at 0940 hours the
infantry were still telling Brigade that there were
no minefields northwest of Buron. 59 Finally,
Lieutenant Campbell of the HLI made several
trips out to the tanks to inform them that the left
flank approaches to Buran were clear of mines.
Once the tanks were convinced that this was the
case they proceeded to assist "B" Company in
cleaning out the enemy machine gun posts one
by one. 60 This was very definitely intimate
support, the sort that the Sherman tank could
not provide.
Having cleared out the German infantry the
tanks moved to the high ground southeast of the
village, but their day was far from over. Joined
by two troops of British 17 -pounder M -10 tank
destroyers from 62nd Anti-Tank Regiment, "A"
Squadron now fought a defensive battle against
counterattacking Panthers.Together they defeated
the German tanks, the M-10s claiming 13 tanks
at a cost of six of their own. 61 "A" Squadron began
this battle at half strength and by the end of the
day was reduced to four vehicles. However, the

infantry fighting in Buron continued until 1430
hours and the SFR did not report consolidating
on the high ground southeast of Buran until1512
hours. 62
In their attack on Gruchy the SDGs also
moved tactically two up, "B" Company on the
right supported by No.2 Troop, and "A" Company
on the left supported by No.1 Troop. 63 With the
remaining tank troops grouped on the left flank,
the intention had been to support by fire from a
position 600 yards south of Vieux Cairon.
Accounts vary slightly but it appears that the
SDGs came under heavy mortar fire at 0745
hours and machine gun fire by 0754 hours. From
that point the attack progressed rapidly. At 0805
hours the SDGs reported that the supporting
tanks were going into Gruchy, by 0812 hours the
enemy were observed leaving the far end of the
village and by 0830 hours the tanks were
mopping up between Buron and Gruchy. 64 Once
again, success came from the intimate support
of the tanks.
It was only after this tactical success that "B"
Squadron's casualties mounted. The enemy
infantry disposed of, Nos.1 and 2 Troops moved
south of the village while No.3 and HQ Troops
moved north. The southern pair of troops came
under fire from German tanks and anti-tank
weapons firing from the Chateau St. Louet, losing
several vehicles. North of Gruchy the remaining
troops encountered "very stiff resistance" from
German infantry, and there too long-range antitank fire accounted for all of No 3 Troop.

By 0950 hours the SDGs reported they were
ready to take Chateau St. Louet, and five minutes
later General Keller ordered Brigadier
Cunningham to do so. 65 However, "C" Company
did not close up to the Chateau until1445 hours
and accompanied by the armour went into it at
1510 hours. This time squares with the SFR
account that reported all three squadrons were
employed in putting the infantry into the Chateau
at 1515 hours. 66
The varying fortunes of the two infantry
battalions reflected a tactical anomaly that could
not have been anticipated. The 1Oth Company of
25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was in position
forward of Buron but its 11th Company between
Buran and Galmanche had already been attacked
by the British 59th Division in Phase I. In
15
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Above: An example of Gennan defensive positions around the town of Galmanche, typical of those encountered

during Operation "Charnwood." Galmanche was one of the main obstacles in the path of the British 59th
Division (attacking just to the east of the Canadians) during Operation "Charnwood." This groundcheck,
compiled three days before the start of "Charnwood" by the Aerial Photography Interpretation Sections
(APIS) of 59 Division and 2nd Anny, is based on details obtained from interpretation of the aerial photo and
intelligence gathered from patrols and the capture of prisoners.. The photograph was taken by an aircraft
from 39 Wing, Royal Canadian Air Force.
Left: A composite air photo of the Charnwood battlefield (Phase II objectives).
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Sherman tank advancing through Buran, France, 9 July 1944.

retrospect, it appears that this company, faced
with a breakthrough by British tanks and
infantry, retreated towards lOth Company. The
identical situation obtained between Gruchy and
Buran where the 9th Company, attacked by the
SDGs and "B" Squadron, moved toward battalion
headquarters. In effect, this concentrated the
whole of the 3rd Battalion in Buran supported
by its own mortars and machine guns plus tanks
and artillery from divisional assets. While not
actually outnumbering their attackers in the
Highland Light Infantry, the Germans were
considerably better off with regard to supporting
weapons. This situation at Buran occurred in a
position believed at the time to be the key
controlling other objectives and thus the most
heavily defended. 67 Thus, despite all the
resources at the disposal of I Corps, at the sharp
end a single battalion of infantry supported by a
single squadron of tanks was attacking another
battalion defending from prepared positions. A
careful reading of the doctrinal manuals indicates
that this weak and dispersed assault was
definitely not "by the book." Little wonder that
the battle lasted all day in the ruins of Buran.

Like the SDGs, the North Nova Scotia
Highlanders had their plans upset by the
continuing fighting in Buran. Their Forming Up
Place (FUP) was supposed to be in Buran from
where they would advance southeast towards
Authie. "D" Company would attack frontally as
Fire Company supported by "A" on the left flank
and "B" on the right. Once they secured Authie,
"C" Company was tasked with the exploitation
to Franqueville. 68 The NNS reported they were at
their FUP at 1045 hours, but they had already
received fire from St. Contest in getting there and
worse was to follow. There were still Germans in
trenches at the far side of Buran and their fire
pinned down "D" Company. "B" Company
discovered the same tactical situation on the west
side of Buran. There were still Germans in the
orchard on Buran's southern limits that had to
be cleared out by infantry and tanks before the
battalion could move on. Consequently, it was a
"badly battered battalion" that jumped off at 1515
hours. 69 Fortunately, the NNS found no Germans
in the first houses in Authie and the regiment
reported the village captured by 1530 hours.
Buoyed by this relatively swift victory and
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supported by the remnants of "A" and "C"
Squadrons of the Sherbrookes, "C" Company
advanced towards Franqueville, reaching it by
1600 hours. 70
While 9 CIB's attacks were clearing Buron,
Gruchy and Authie, 7 CIB was moving forward.
At 1000 hours they were in position northeast of
Vieux Cairon, at 1245 hours they had moved to
a position between Buran and Gruchy, and by
1800 hours they were at their startlines southeast
of Authie. From their startlines on the BuronAuthie road, the Regina Rifles supported by "A"
Squadron of the 1st Hussars would attack on
the right, first capturing the gun site at the point
where two tracks converged northwest of the
Abbey d'Ardenne and then the Abbey itself.
Simultaneously, the Ca..11.adian Scottish supported
by "C" Squadron of the Hussars, and keeping to
the north of the Authie-Cussy road, were to
capture defensive works several hundred yards
northwest of Cussy and then the village. 71 Having
suffered substantial casualties in Operation
"Windsor," the Royal Winnipeg Rifles (RWR) with
"B" Squadron of the Hussars in support were in
reserve for this phase of operations.
The Canadian Scottish, supported by "C"
Squadron of the 1st Hussars, attacked with "A"
Company on the right and "C" Company on the
left, advancing in extended line for their "walk"
to Cussy. 72 They too had their difficulties, being
shelled while moving to their assembly area near
Gruchy and then receiving fire from Buron.
Consequently, H-Hour was set back to 1740
hours. 73 "A" Company was tasked with reducing
the strongpoint 300 yards short of Cussy while
"B" and "C" took Cussy itself in a pincer
movement. Soon after they began to advance an
"unforeseen eventuality" complicated matters both flanks were open. On their left, the British
59th Division had not taken Bitot, and the Abbey
had not yet fallen to the Reginas. By 2000 hours
they reported to Brigade that tanks were on "both
sides of us. " 74 In response, "B" and "D"
Companies and the anti-tank section of the Royal
Winnipeg Rifles were sent forward. One company
proceeded to Cussy filling the gap between "B"
and "C" Companies of the Regina Rifles with the
other held in reserve. 75 Meanwhile, a German
counterattack failed, losing six tanks to the
supporting armour and prompting the CSR War
Diary to refer to the "excellent service" performed

by Canadian tanks. 76 By 2300 hours Cussy was
firmly in Canadian hands. 77
The Regina Rifles encountered many of the
same difficulties as the CSR in reaching their
startline, their attack being delayed until1800
hours. Their plan was for "B" Company to first
capture the small mounds 400 yards east of
Authie, after which "C" and "D" Companies would
pass through to capture the Abbey. 78 German
anti-tank gun fire destroyed the majority of their
supporting tanks, however, and when the attack
went in it was without tanks or artillery. As a
consequence, at 2100 hours they were just over
halfway to the Abbey and tenacious German
resistance caused heavy casualties in "B" and "C"
Companies. 79 Nightfall found the Abbey still in
German hands; the Canadian attacks were
finished for the day. 80

Conclusion
o how did "Charnwood" compare to the
infantry/tank doctrine that the Canadians
had studied? In certain fundamentals, the battles
north of Caen were very similar to those
described in the training pamphlets. The
frontages assigned to the infantry battalions and
companies were close to those they had practised
and the pace of advance equally so. Also expected
was the physical separation of the tanks and
infantry that had followed from the introduction
of the Sherman in 1943.

S

However, there were two areas where the
battle varied from accepted doctrine. The first
was the diminished level of tank support. Thus
far in the war the ideal had usually been
maintained at one tank regiment to one infantry
battalion. Despite occasional references in the
manuals to individual squadrons supporting
infantry battalions this level of armoured support
invariably contained mitigating circumstances.
In "Charnwood" the level of tank support was
reduced without any compensatory factors, and
the fighting clearly shows that earlier cautions
about the tank squadron being too weak to
support a two-company attack were wellfounded.
In the attacks on both Buran and Gruchy the
supporting tank squadrons were swiftly reduced
in numbers with some troops being eliminated
19
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entirely. Simply put, there were not enough tanks
operating on the frontages of the two infantry
battalions. By the end of the day all units of 2
CAB had seen action, suggesting that it might
have made better sense to use an armoured
regiment with each battalion attack in 9 CIB,
including that of the NNS. This advice is tendered
with the knowledge that the final objectives of
the operation were limited to roughly 4,000 yards
regardless of the success enjoyed on 8 July 1944.
Saving a reserve of tanks made good sense if the
advance was to continue immediately, or a major
counterattack was expected. As to the first, this
was simply not part of the plan. Once
"Charnwood" succeeded 21 Army Group
intended to mount another operation to clear
Caen south of the river. Regarding the second
possibility, local counterattacks could logically
be expected, but larger operations could not be
contemplated by the Germans in the face of
ULTRA intelligence and the massive air and
artillery superiority. In fact, employing the whole
of 2 CAB might well have reduced the tank
casualties of the units involved by swamping the
German defenders.
The second departure from doctrine was the
way tanks provided close support to the infantry.
Analysis ofthe fighting reveals that the doctrinal
tendency of the armour to hang back was not a
viable technique. Any successes that the
Canadians enjoyed on 8 July 1944 followed from
the intimate support of their accompanying
tanks, not from tanks firing from the flank or
rear. Buron was cleared of its German defenders
only when the tanks used their machine guns at
close range just as infantry tanks had formerly
done. Contrary to what The Co-operation of
Tanks with Irifantry Divisions in Offensive
Operations had claimed, the tanks were
"partners in the assault."
Fresh battlefield evidence existed that
employing the Sherman tank as a direct-fire
close-support weapon was viable. On 6 June
1944 Canadian tanks had performed in that role,
a role that was planned for from the start. In
General Keller's opinion, the overwhelming
success of the seaborne assault, with less than
half the expected casualties, was largely explained
by the presence of the tanks. 81 Canadian
commanders ignored this evidence in the postassault period to the detriment of operations.
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